

# CLIENTELISM AND IDENTITY. MOROCCO'S DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE

**Juan I Castien Maestro**

Complutense University of Madrid

**Abstract.-** The Moroccan regime is showing considerable resistance to the protest movements currently rocking the Arab world. This firm stand is based on certain unique characteristics. Arab societies as a whole have little internal unity and, in this kind of situation, a clientelistic type of relationship plays a crucial role. In Morocco, clientelism has a more inclusive nature than in other countries because exclusions on the grounds of religion, "tribe", ethnic group and political ideology are much less intense. Specifically, this lack of political exclusion is related to the broad ideological eclecticism manifested by the Moroccan authorities. Depending on the circumstances, the government focuses on a loose combination of fundamental elements such as Islam, democracy, nationalism and development. Thanks to this strategy, it has managed to unite several different political legitimates and win the support of disparate sectors of the population. Some sectors of the population differ greatly in terms of ideology so the government steps in to act as arbitrator in any conflicts. This enables the government to be more flexible without affecting its oligarchic and authoritarian nature. In order for Morocco to be a genuine democracy, it would need to reduce clientelistic networks and establish a cultural and ideological synthesis that would be acceptable to the majority of the people, without requiring authoritarian arbitration.

**Keywords.-** Morocco, modernisation, clientelism, identity, ideology

## I. Dilemmas for the Moroccan opposition

Over the last few months the Arab world has been rocked by a wave of discontent that has already brought down two ancient dictatorships and is putting serious pressure on half a dozen others. However, this wave is not having the same mighty impact on the entire Arab world, and not all Arab regimes are showing the same ability to offer resistance. Therefore, extreme generalisations should be avoided as the outcome of the conflicts between governments and protestors is not the same in each country. The situation in Morocco perfectly illustrates the need to carefully study the particularities of each specific case. There is a reasonably large social opposition within the country but, even so, it is much smaller than in other places and has less ambitious goals. The opposition are not calling for the "regime to fall", as per the already popular slogan, and are far from demanding the fall of the leaders. They are only demanding democratic reform which, in principle, is compatible with the current official policy that apparently aims to build a democracy founded on national historic traditions. The moderation of these demands offers great

benefits. They appeal to a wide sector of society, possibly the majority of the population, who, in spite of their discontent with many aspects of rule, do not question the country's fundamental institutions such as the Monarchy. The opposition also avoids the danger of a direct clash with the security forces because they have ample experience of the severe consequences when conciliatory strategies fail. However, above all, their approach means that at least some of the demands made will be listened to. However, it is this area wherein the greatest danger lies. The concessions made by the authorities can easily strengthen the liberal appearance they wish to portray and will legitimize their objective of committing to a long-term democratic transition. As part of this makeover, they will also attempt to co-opt the opposition and integrate them into the existing system of reward sharing. As has occurred many times before in Morocco and other areas, the final outcome of such moderate opposition could strengthen the current regime as its legitimacy would increase in the eyes of the general population and draw new social sectors into its clientelistic networks. Certain concessions may be of benefit to the rulers as they try to merge their interests with those of their opponents. However, in the long term, these protestors would be wise to question whether any achievements may only have served to strengthen a regime whose oligarchic nature has not been fundamentally affected, and whether these alterations will actually end up being an impediment to further genuine changes. All these factors mean that moderation has become a double-edged sword.

This is the great dilemma currently facing the democratic opposition in Morocco. The opposition is certainly substantial but it is very mixed and only partially organised. Although these kinds of dilemmas are very common, in Morocco's case they are particularly difficult due to the extraordinarily complicated nature of the political system, meaning that it cannot be pigeonholed into the usual categories of conventional analysis. This particularly challenges any dualistic dichotomy between a democracy and a dictatorship. At a first glance this appears to be an interesting combination of both. In fact, Morocco has undoubted democratic features such as regular elections at various levels, extensive freedom of expression and association, and above all, the express acceptance of political pluralism. However, all these factors are counteracted by other, totally opposite elements. The elections are subject to various manipulations; certain subjects are taboo; the arbitrariness of the public leaders are endless, and the Crown's powers are much greater than in a normal constitutional Monarchy. It would be easiest to conclude that we have found a kind of "hybrid" system that is a mixture of a "dictablanda" and a "democradura". If this was the case, it would be an internally contradictory system subject to an intense tug-of-war between the democratic camps and those that are more authoritarian. Many see this as the arena in which the more democratic and progressive forces stand against the more regressive and authoritarian forces. According to the optimists, little by little, the democratic forces are winning the battle. This would be the case both in the event that the ruling Moroccan politicians genuinely aspire to introduce an authentic democracy in their country or if there is hope that, although this may not be the actual intention, for better or worse the modernization process being promoted will push people towards making increasing democratic demands which authorities will eventually have no choice but to satisfy. But all of this is only the half-truth. We should not

always have an essentialist view of the “democratic” and the “authoritarian” as two totally incompatible entities with a “positive” and a “negative” designation respectively. It is not the case that any increase in the first must be to the detriment of the second, and vice versa. According to that line of thinking, any democratic measures introduced would automatically reduce the authoritarian nature of the system, whilst any authoritarian policy would have the opposite effect. However, the reality can be more complex. At least some of the democratic, or rather, liberal measures that are adopted could be viewed as way to consolidate the system as whole. The oligarchy would be seen to be more flexible, subtle, and more open to other social sectors although, ultimately, it would continue to be the same authoritarian oligarchy as before. However, to fully understand the reasons behind this disturbing possibility we must take an in-depth look at the nature of the social and political system that reigns in Morocco. To that end we shall consider some of the hypotheses suggested by different disciplines such as anthropology and social psychology, without being overly worried about adopting an essayistic tone.

## II. The general anatomy of clientelism

From one point of view, the Moroccan State as well as Moroccan society are both extremely clientelistic (Cf. Castien Maestro, 2007b: 87-98, Hammoudi, 2001: 31-72), as are their neighbouring countries. Therefore, if we want to understand how this political and social system works and what the real likelihood for democracy is in this country, we need to examine the nature of clientelistic social relations. The term “clientelism” is very much in fashion today but the meaning of it is not always clear. We understand a clientelistic relationship to be a relationship of exchange, to give something expecting something in return. But the exchange we are referring to in Morocco is of a more informal nature compared to a strictly commercial exchange. The difference between the two kinds of exchange lies in the criteria used to measure the value of the exchange. In the clientelistic exchange, the criteria are much looser and more dependent on the particular context. These criteria would also apply to the time periods involved in the exchange. Furthermore, almost any asset or service can be used in an exchange of this kind. This has been extensively demonstrated in sociological literature (cf. Blau, 1982; Bourdieu, 1991; Goffman, 1970). As such, material possessions, displays of personal favour, services of any kind, jobs, governmental decisions and even money itself can all be exchanged under the heading of “favours”, “tips”, “benefits”, “rewards” or indeed, any other name. These are usually unequal exchanges in that someone gives more than they receive or someone receives more than they give. When this occurs repeatedly, we can refer to it as an “exploitative” relationship. In addition exchanges take place between people with very different social statuses who need things with different levels of intensity. It is these differences that make the exchanges unequal and exploitative but, above all, they also mean that some individuals remain inferior to others because they are dependent on them for what they need. This forces them to meet the demands of the “giver” even if this goes against their personal wishes. This can be called a *dominating* relationship. The clientelistic relationship stems from this: an informal exchange relationship between people with unequal social

status so that some are dominated and almost always exploited by others. These clientelistic relationships can be very widespread and it is these which make it possible to involve masses of people and influence different social groups, geographical regions and institutional spheres as such pervading the whole of society.

As a result of this far-reaching influence, clientelism does not only engender domination and exploitation, it also creates *integration*. Through this succession of informal exchanges, people become connected to each other and are included in the same social group. There is no doubt that this connection can be made in other ways, but the great advantage of clientelism lies in its extreme simplicity. It is not surprising that the rules of informal exchange are, in general, simple and easy to learn, these exchanges are also easy to arrange. All that is required is something that is of interest to exchange and the people available to do it. There is no need for complex organisational backing. This is why clientelism easily flourishes everywhere. In contrast, other possibly preferable methods of uniting people require greater social complexity and, consequently, a much greater investment of time and effort. This is what happens in bureaucratic organisations regardless of whether these are public or private. They will have formal, precise rules that must be adhered to and which usually follow strictly meritocratic criteria in relation to staff management. Due to the complexity and rigidity of these bureaucratic social relationships, these organisations do not actually exist in an “unadulterated” form anywhere in the world. To differing degrees they all conform to clientelistic-type relationships. The same occurs in democratic systems which are also regulated by enormous amounts of formal rules. Additionally, in a system of this kind the individual must think of themselves in some respects as a part of the political body as a whole. Therefore, in terms of general interests, the individual's wishes must be compatible with the system.

This is where the gulf between clientelistic relationships and other social relationships becomes apparent. Clientelism is distinguished by the link between specific individuals satisfying their own interests. In principle, this would be a direct, face to face link, although in more complex cases it may also engender indirect relationships between those participating in the same exchange network. By contrast, in the types of relationship we have already examined, the connection between individuals is influenced by a wider organization (Cf. Blau, 1982). Adapting to relationships of this kind implies thinking to a much greater extent in terms of organisations and their objectives rather than personal and immediate interests. This requires a greater ability of abstraction in order to differentiate more than before between the specific individual and their role within the organisation. None of this is simple. It requires a shared culture that supplies the necessary intellectual schemes for that purpose and a specific socialisation process to internalise people. This has all taken centuries of effort and has been one of the most striking results of the modernization process. This is why it is harder for societies which are less developed to establish these new kinds of organisations and why those involved so often reproduce their old clientelistic habits with all of the inefficiency, authoritarianism and inequality that these bring (Cf. Elias, 1990: 244-252). This is why the battle for modernisation frequently becomes a battle against

clientelism. However, at times it is modernisation itself that encourages the development of this kind of social relationship. After all, there are greater riches thanks to modernisation and, therefore, greater opportunities in the favours market. Likewise, a more modern society is a more integrated, connected society which contrasts with the segmentation that characterises more traditional societies. People tend to travel more, study more, and work for large corporations so they have more contact with the public administration. They interact more with others and, in the absence of good systems of general and collective regulations which are so difficult to establish, it is only logical that they will opt for the familiar clientelistic system. The great paradox stems from the fact that modernization can cultivate something as fundamentally traditional as clientelism and that this ends up being, to a certain degree, vital for its development. However, even from the point of view of social integration, this usefulness will only be relative as the clientelistic connections have some weaknesses. Above all, they rely on the idea of “personal interests” which is well matched with extreme individualism where everyone is “looking out for themselves”, but if these “personal interests” are not satisfied then these connections can be broken. This is the weak spot in any structured group based on this kind of relationship.

In summary, an unequal modernisation that developed too rapidly and with a partially exogenous origin has retained and enhanced some of the traditional elements which would have regressed under a strictly linear evolution. We, therefore, find ourselves looking at an interesting example of what León Trotsky (1971:9) called “the law of combined development”. However, moving away from classic thinking, it is important to emphasise that when these traditional elements are reactivated they can end up being obstacles to the subsequent development of the modernisation process. A good example of this occurs with state politics. One of the fundamental reasons why societies with extensive levels of clientelism are often subject to authoritarian political regimes is the weak social cohesion associated with clientelism. This lack of internal cohesion diminishes people’s ability to stand up to a repressive state. Consequently, their ability to organise themselves is reduced and thus they end up being organised “from outside” by the state itself. Above all, the extensive inconsistencies in governmental decisions that are typical of political systems that lack sufficient controls create excellent opportunities for the development of new clientelistic networks. Elite government members tend to support these networks for their own gain and use them to gain better control over society as a whole. Naturally, the more power these politicians have to distribute favours from the state, the more clientelism will develop. An example of this can be seen in countries whose leaders benefit from the so-called “geostrategic” profits derived from natural resources such as oil, or the aid given by other governments to those whose political goodwill they wish to gain (Cf. Martín Muñoz, 2004: 396). This situation is well-known in a great number of Arab countries, although it is considerably less widespread in Morocco. However, in all these countries, clientelism and political authoritarianism go hand in hand. The survival over decades of authoritarian regimes in these countries can be attributed in many ways to the helplessness of the societies they rule. States that are relatively modern, particularly in terms of their methods of coercion, have arisen from fragmented societies. In this way, state authoritarianism has, to a great extent,

been the end result of an unequal modernisation which has had more effect on the state than society in general (Cf. Ayubi, 1996; Castien Maestro, 2009: 84-88). Nonetheless, this lack of cohesion in society has been subsequently recreated and perpetuated through the comprehensive manipulation of clientelism by state leaders. These governments have benefited from a weak situation which they have helped further. Therefore, part of the price these societies have had to pay in supporting these regimes has been in the form of a loss of structure. This, in turn, has been an obstacle to the creation of stronger states that can improve society (Cf. Ayubi, 1996: 21-27; Castien Maestro, 2009: 87) because both state and society are co-dependant on each other in their fragility.

### III. Inclusive clientelism in Morocco

It is important to establish the more general features of clientelism but this, on its own, is insufficient. We also need to determine the specific type of clientelism that predominates in Morocco. This can be defined as *inclusive clientelism* which is characterised by the relative absence of exclusions when it comes to participation in the informal exchange networks. In one way or another there are many people involved in these networks. However, at any given time, there are many others who have been excluded, but who have reasonable hope that one day they will be admitted to this inner circle. The clientelistic networks are spread over different regions, professional groups, and even a large part of the politico-ideological spectrum. In this way they run through the different levels of society until they converge at the highest level. This creates a type of framework which helps structure society and gives it a greater cohesion than that of other surrounding societies. As we will see further on, the political system becomes more flexible which allows it to better adapt to social demands, and integrate and neutralise any dissidents. There are only a small number of measures that discriminate against or exclude members of society which leads to greater inclusiveness overall. It is through these measures that certain individuals are expelled from clientelistic networks or only admitted to the lower, most exploited and dominated levels. Although these measures can be very diverse, here we will focus on those that are based on *social categorisation* (Cf. Castien Maestro, 2003: 62-72; Tajfel, 1984). Social categorisation occurs when people are given a specific social identity which, in this particular case, would mean that they would not qualify as suitable members for certain clientelistic relationships. We can identify four different criteria, or basic principles, for social categorisation in the countries in the region. These are religious, tribal, ethno-regional and politico-ideological principles. As we will try to demonstrate, these four criteria have less of an impact in Morocco than in its neighbouring countries. Naturally, aside from the already mentioned authoritarianism, the Moroccan population in general suffers serious social exclusivism. The institutional mechanisms do not work as they should and people who do not have the crucial "contacts" frequently suffer various woes such as unemployment, abuse from the authorities and a lack of public benefits. All these basic measures can be bought with money or services but to do so requires involvement in clientelistic networks and people cannot always provide the necessary money or offer another valuable service. This

type of exclusiveness is not generally linked to the identifying factors mentioned. This means that it is difficult for those who are excluded to view themselves as part of a group with a shared identity who stand in opposition to those who are included in these networks - the people against whom the excluded would need to organise themselves.

One criterion for admission to the social group could be resorting to religious element, that of belonging to a particular religious order even if only in the formal sense. Such criterion can only be used when there are different religious ascriptions, that is, when society is heterogeneous from the denominational perspective. This is a common situation in the Near East. In Iraq, the Shi'ites have been victimised for decades due to discrimination of this kind, as have the Christians and Animists in Sudan. In Syria, the Alawi minority has taken control of the state apparatus and disregards other denominations (Cf. Ayubi, 1996; Martín Muñoz, 2004: 88-91, 103-108 y 120-128). Morocco is different due to its almost absolute religious homogeneity. Since the Middle Ages it has had an almost completely Muslim, Sunni and Maleki population. In times gone by, Morocco did have a thriving Jewish community but, although some members are prominent figures, nowadays this has been reduced to a merely theoretical demographic presence. This homogeneity makes either discrimination or the granting of privilege on strictly religious grounds impossible. However, it is true that those who openly remain outside the Muslim community or behave in an un-Islamic manner by not complying with the ritualistic rules can be victims of various day-to-day forms of exclusion (Cf. Castien Maestro, 2003: 142-148 y 437-443). In any event, the absence of discrimination between different denominations makes Moroccan clientelism much more inclusive in this particular respect.

The second criterion we mentioned was tribal. Until recently, Arab societies have been tribal societies and, to some extent, many still are today. A tribe can be defined as a group of paternal descendants from a literal or imaginary common ancestor who lived several generations ago. The effect of such close kinship serves to establish a shared social identity which later translates into cooperation between those who possess the same background. Such cooperation can evolve into an effective collaboration linked by a series of entrenched traditions. On the other hand, it can also be reduced to a merely generic feeling of solidarity although, under certain circumstances, this feeling can be triggered into something more powerful. In general, the tribal relationship has not played an important role in the life of the people, in contrast to other minorities that are based on patrilineal connections (Cf. Bonte y Conte, 1991). Therefore, when we use the term tribalism, we are alluding to a wide variety of specific situations. The process of modernisation has had ambivalent effects on tribalism. On the one hand, it has encouraged the birth of greater individualism and a growing disaffection toward collectives founded on family relationships, as well as a readjustment of loyalty that is now channelled to broader entities such as the nation. On the other hand, this general tendency has been counteracted by other tendencies that have the opposite effect. Given the deficiencies of the modernisation process as a whole, the old social units have retained a measure of functionality in that they help to weave a mutual network of support against the deficiencies of the state and the market. These social

units also develop into factions who aim to take control of the various institutions and seize their resources (Cf. Martín Muñoz, 2004). Once they reach this point, tribalism and clientelism become interwoven. General kinship bonds help when choosing possible members so, in that sense, tribalism contributes to defining the clientelistic networks. We can, therefore, now refer to *tribally defined* clientelism. However, the actual situation varies from country to country. Tribalism, for instance, does not have the same measure of power in all countries due to different historical traditions. In the particular case of Morocco, the modernisation that began with the Protectorate has resulted in a clear detribalisation even though the bonds of family relationships still retain significant relevance especially in rural areas. Undoubtedly, on a lesser scale, the bonds of a paternal or maternal relationship and those from marriage have great importance in day to day life and, of course, influence clientelistic relations. This phenomenon now has a different appearance. Above all, here in Morocco, the state has not been taken over by any “tribal” group. Certainly, the Alawi dynasty has been in control for three centuries and there are a number of Makhzen families connected to the reigning house through various means, including family bonds. However, this upper class group are not impervious to new arrivals and, above all, the clientelistic network behind them is not founded on a tribal basis. Therefore, we can see that there are no great inclusions or exclusions on a family bond basis. In this respect, Moroccan clientelism is more inclusive than that of other neighbouring countries.

Upon further consideration we can see that the ethnic factor is extremely applicable in a large area of the region. Everywhere there are people who either receive privileges or are discriminated because of certain cultural features they have, or, the social identities they themselves create or that others categorise them with. This positive or negative discrimination also affects the people’s participation in clientelistic networks. However, such unequal treatment could also be due to very different motives. It may simply occur that the ethnic groups or regions that the country’s leaders belong to receive certain privileges as part of a strategy to improve their own social class. It is also possible that, for various reasons, the group in power has made an enemy of a particular people and discriminates against them in punishment. Nevertheless, it is possible to overcome these enmities. This was clearly shown in the majority of dealings between the Moroccan Crown and the inhabitants of the north of the country when a new King came to the throne. Perhaps in the future the same will happen with the former Spanish Sahara. Some situations can be more complicated, such as when the national and cultural identity model advocated by the authorities has been fabricated from a particular ethnic group to exclude those who display other cultural features and have different ethnic identities. It is possible that these people will be pressured to conform but some of them may resist and seek to reaffirm their different culture and identity. If there is resistance, then their relationship with the ruling sector will deteriorate and their exclusion will become more acute. The example of the Kurdish people who were confronted with official national identities that were Turkish, Persian or Arabic, depending on the country, had a particularly tragic outcome. In these cases, the exclusion is not based on a more or less circumstantial enmity between the leading group and a particular people. It arises from the specific ways in which the national culture and identity has been enforced, something

which is considerably harder to change. This second type of exclusion has occurred in the Maghreb region with the Berber-speaking people. Some of their cultural features have the same origins as the Arabic peoples, but in other cases they take on a Berber or Amazigh identity that is more or less contrary to the Arab identity. It is difficult for these people to conform to a national identity model that is based on Arab culture. Furthermore, this is an Arab culture based on idealistic models that supposedly conform to the prevailing realities in the Near East. As a result, the Amazigh people are unwelcome in this region. The Arabs may cherish the hope that a progressive Arabisation will ultimately eradicate them completely or, at the very least, reduce them to nothing more than folklore. Meanwhile, those whose mother tongue is the Amazigh language are forced to study in Arabic. Logically, this increases their workload so that they frequently end up feeling contempt for their own language and cultural makeup. When Algeria adopted a militant Pan-Arabism ideology imported from the East, it suffered an extremely acrimonious situation. However, in Morocco, this latest ideology has been less apparent leading to a greater tolerance of the Berber language and culture. It should be noted that, in recent decades, there has been a progressive acceptance of the Amazigh people as part of Moroccan society. This has facilitated their increased presence in all areas of society, beginning with the media.

As a result, Moroccan clientelism is also less exclusive from the ethnic point of view. The fourth and last criterion we will consider is based on political ideology. When the ruling group upholds a particular ideology that defines people and bases its plans for society on that thinking, then those who share this ideology and accept the plans are rewarded. Those who do not, are discriminated, persecuted and treated in such a hostile manner that, in extreme cases, they pay for being different with their own lives. Again, the Moroccan version of clientelism is less exclusive in this respect. To understand why this is so, we must take a brief detour from our current argument to analyse the different ways in which governments can affect a society's plans and ideology. We will also examine the role these factors play in building a more integrated and cohesive society.

#### **IV. A certain ideological eclecticism**

In contrast to other governments in the region, the Moroccan state is not an *ideological* state. An ideological state derives its legitimacy from its commitment to a clearly defined social plan that is based on its own ideology (Castien Maestro, 2007a: 83). The state's fundamental mission, therefore, is to model society on this plan and extend the plan beyond its own borders. The ideologies and plans set out by these governments could, of course, be very varied and span different opinions; from the left to the right-wingers and from the most radical secularity to the most extreme denominationalism. This kind of ideological state is very common in the part of the world we are discussing. If we step outside of the official Arab world, we can see that this was the case in the past with Ataturk's Turkey and is the case today in the Islamic Republic of Iran. A similar situation exists with the Saudi Arabian Wahhabi and the Syrian Ba'ath. In their day, Ba'athist Iraq and pro-soviet South Yemen also belonged to the same group of ideological states. Without doubt, every state has to adhere

in some degree to a certain ideology and project for society. The identifying characteristic of the ideological state is that it does so in an extreme manner. This kind of state is impervious and exclusive by virtue of its ideology and social plan. The ideology is considered so critical that it must be imposed on society even if this is against the wishes of the majority of the population. Consequently, an ideological state is a repressive state although, it can, at any given moment, enjoy the approval of the majority of its population. By way of contrast, a *democratic* state is characterised by adhering solely to general principles that are widely accepted and it permits different ideologies and disparate social plans to develop. As opposed to ideological absolutism and authoritarian social plans, under a democratic state, the main concern is respect for individual freedom of choice and a collective submission to the authorities. The people can display relative independence from the state's thinking at any time.

However, in contrast to these authentic models, there is type of government we can call a *pragmatic* state. In this type of state, the leaders only aspire to remain in power and, if possible, increase their power, consolidate their control over society and strengthen the society they rule over. They are authoritarian but their authoritarianism is in the interest of their most “immediate” needs. Therefore, they are not closely associated with any particular ideology. They may adhere to a certain ideology but it will merely be superficial adherence, as another tactic to reach their most practical objectives. Perhaps they may feel that a particular ideology is the most likely to gain popular favour or outside support. They may feel that it will enable them to implement an economic strategy that will allow the country to develop further. However, if the situation changes over time then the government may also change their ideology. In this way, the leaders of a pragmatic state may change their ideology time and time again. Generally, this is what we see in this region of the world. There may be a progressive abandonment of socialist plans to make way for more liberal ones and then, at a later stage, there may be a progressive return to a religious legitimacy. In reality of course, when it comes to pure, idealistic thinking, the borders between an ideological state and a pragmatic state are somewhat blurred. It is normal for the ruling group to attempt to hide their naked ambition for power by alluding to an ideology of collective interests. It is also very common for governments to evolve from initially being ideological states to becoming more pragmatic states at a later stage. In this event, the wish to implement a particular way of thinking will yield place to the state's need to retain and increase its own power. On many occasions, this general process is furthered by clientelism. In this way the ruling group progressively becomes part of a clientelistic system so that they are increasingly interested in strengthening and satisfying their clientelistic network. To do this they will employ any kind of corrupt practice to divert resources to this network. This kind of behaviour is certainly incompatible with the publicly assumed ideology which would become a mere facade. An interesting example analysed by Bassam Tibi (2001: 171-182) is that of the Ba'athist regimes in Syria and Iraq. Their policy was aimed at primarily strengthening their own clientelistic network which was defined by religious, ethnic and tribal criteria combined with a passionate Pan-Arabist rhetoric. These rulers will speak of a bigger picture, but this is to cover their most selfish interests and, therefore, the state's association with the ideological

social plan becomes increasingly cynical. However, both ideology and an authoritarian social plan continue to be useful for various reasons. For instance, the ideology in question could continue to be partially accepted by both a section of the ruling group and the people. This would have a concurrent cohesive and stimulating effect. In second place, by abandoning an ideology, a ruling group could lose their legitimacy as this could give the justified impression that they are solely guided by their own interests. Finally, it must be borne in mind that adherence to a particular ideology may continue to be useful as the defining criteria for clientelistic networks. This would allow some people into the network and keep others out. Evidently, those who are excluded will harbour plenty of reasons for discontent while those included will feel satisfied and ready to defend what they have. A regime that is overly non-ideological may not have as many enemies but it is unlikely to have as many friends. The fate recently suffered by Ben Ali and Mubarak is very instructive. Their authoritarianism and clientelism was not linked to a clear social plan which meant that it became an unjustifiable burden on society as a whole, with no one willing to fight in defence of a non-existent ideological plan. Excessive pragmatism can end up being counterproductive.

The previous statement leads us on to a basic fact: ideology can affect areas where there are no clientelistic links. In the previous section we noted that clientelism generates a fragile social integration based on immediate gain. That is why it is rare for clientelistic links to extend worldwide. Within the countries we are examining, it is normal for the majority of society to be excluded from these clientelistic networks (Cf. Ayubi, 1996; Castien Maestro, 2009; Martín Muñoz, 2004). This creates significant internal cohesion problems. In this kind of situation it may be advantageous to resort to a shared ideology. Those who adhere to this ideology would, up to a point, begin to think in terms of a shared interest. They would not think on a short-term basis and would be more willing to accept the sacrifices associated with this, even if this meant their exclusion from certain clientelistic networks. Therefore, it may seem convenient to adopt an ideological standpoint because this does not mean creating an ideological state in the strictest sense of the term. This is what the Moroccan authorities have done since their Independence. The Moroccan government has a series of very clear ideological references that include: Islam with its Sunni and Maleki versions that are compatible with Sufism (Cf. Hammoudi, 2001; Tozy, 2000), nationalism, development, democracy... and little else. It adheres to an undefined, unrestrictive ideology that contrasts with the much more restrictive nature of other ideological states and even with pragmatic states that pretend to ideology. It is no small achievement that, through this strategy, the Moroccan state manages to stimulate and integrate part of the population without being restricted by its own ideology or creating excessive exclusions. There are some groups who advocate specific social plans but this is compatible with the state's implementation of a few doctrinal measures that enjoy wide social acceptance. Only those who question the Monarchy, threaten its inviolable nature, challenge the state religion or are dangers to national unity remain outside the law. In this sense, a pluralistic ideology is becoming generally accepted. This is compatible with the official loyalty to a liberal democracy and a "moderate" form of Islam that is in line with national traditions and against all "extremism". From this point of view, the Moroccan state displays various of the basic characteristics of a

democratic state and is separating itself from the traits of a totalitarian or ideological State. However, it is different from a genuinely democratic state in that power is held by a small oligarchy which is not subject to any higher control. A few semi-democratic organisations do not alter this basic reality.

It is important to stress the open and plural nature of the official Moroccan ideology. It is based on traditional Islamic thinking, nationalism, development and democracy amongst other things. These points of departure all originate from different cultures which does not mean that it is impossible for these to be compatible, but it does require serious effort (Cf. Castien Maestro, 2003: 335-391). This is why we can class this official thinking as eclectic ideology and refer to an *ideological eclecticism*. Evidently, this more eclectic ideology contrasts with the simple and coherent thinking that usually characterises ideological States. In any event, some kind of eclecticism would seem to be inevitable given that society is very complex and it is difficult for any ideology to completely take control, so therefore, it must incorporate different ideas. When it is done properly, eclecticism can allow an association with different doctrinal traditions and, in that way, connect different social sectors that are unequally related to each other. For Morocco's rulers, the connection to Islam helps attract the more religious sectors who are usually, but not always, the most conservative people. References to development or democracy allow the state to connect with the more modern and secular sectors. It should come as no surprise that other far more ideological states have also made amalgamations of this kind. A good example of this is Saudi Arabia which combines Wahhabism with significant technocratic development (Cf. Castien Maestro, 2007b), or the now defunct regime of Saddam Hussein which was increasingly resorting to Islamic thinking in contrast to its initial extensive secularism. A certain degree of eclecticism would always seem inevitable, but is becoming particularly necessary in modern Arab societies. The inhabitants of these societies need to combine cultural elements from the West with others taken from their own historical culture. These elements are tremendously variable and subject to many different interpretations. In addition to this, the more traditional social structures coexist alongside more modern versions which requires different codes of behaviour regardless of whether these social structures originate from outside the country or whether they have been developed in an autochthonous manner. This results in a certain degree of inadequacy between all the different social structures which consequently enforces a corresponding degree of leniency amongst them (Cf. Castien Maestro, 2009).

Nevertheless, this eclecticism can be displayed in many different ways. The eclectic ideology in question can at times appear confining and restrictive. This could seem to be a contradiction in terms, but it is not. Although the ideology is eclectic and relates to different ideas and therefore to different social sectors, what can happen is that this particular combination of elements comes to be viewed as the only admissible and legitimate way of thinking. No other equally eclectic combinations are tolerated. Therefore we find ourselves seeing something that could be called a closed eclecticism - a monolithic eclecticism. This kind of phenomenon will logically be closely linked to political authoritarianism. An authoritarian regime could present its particular eclectic construction as the only authorised one and persecute any other thinking as an

unacceptable deviation. The opposition movement with totalitarian aspirations could also have the same outlook. In our opinion, the official Algerian ideology that came to the fore during the Houari Boumediene government would be a notable example of this policy. (Cf. Castien Maestro, 2010; Martín Muñoz, 2004: 91-99). This ideology was distinguished by a combination of Islam, socialism, nationalism and Pan-Arabism. However, the form of Islam featured was the apparently revolutionary Islam. The socialism theory was a Muslim socialism, not Marxist. They implemented Arabic and Islamic nationalism and, therefore, excluded the Amazigh culture and language. The Pan-Arabist thinking was formulated from an anti-imperialistic viewpoint and took the idealistic model of Arab culture from the Near East. It was an eclecticism that included, but also excluded. This ideological exclusivism was very apt for the extremely authoritarian and repressive nature of the regime behind it. However, the Algerian rulers did not have an absolute monopoly on the ideology so Islamists could gradually challenge for control of their doctrinal synthesis and emphasize the Islamic component. In this way they gave the ideology a more conservative tone and removed the more left-wing aspects. They made the most of the idea that the official ideology should be monolithic and exclude deviationists while transforming it in accord with their own objectives. Moroccan eclecticism is, however, much less monolithic. It is more open, tolerant and plural which, up to a certain degree, makes it less exclusive and it is certainly less so than in the past. The left-wingers have been the victims of this exclusivity as they have been accused of challenging the country's Muslim traditions. However, some Islamists have condemned attempts to promote an intolerant, foreign form of Islam which is alien to their national culture.

## V. Domination Strategies

Once we have determined the main features of inclusive clientelism and ideological eclecticism that characterise the Moroccan regime, we can better understand many of its normal practices. Like its surrounding countries, Morocco has a deeply rooted regime based on a society with little internal integration. Its primary role is to organise and connect its people. An important part of this integration strategy is managed through permanent mediation efforts between the different groups in the country who are frequently at odds amongst themselves. The Monarchy generally carries out this function, evoking its tradition role as arbitrator amongst the different tribes and families (Cf. Hammoudi, 2001: 33-45) This role has now been extended to include mediation between the different regional leaders, patrons and syndicates, secularists and the religious, the left, the right, Arabs and Berbers. The Monarchy is the figurehead, or pinnacle, where the different clientelistic networks merge together. When it comes to the link that holds them all together, the role of the Monarch is not merely to mediate between the groups at odds, but it also entails a form of clientelistic patronage on a grand scale. The Palace distributes favours such as governmental responsibilities, investments, grants, licences, business shares and, even pardons. Through a skilful policy of rewards and punishments it commands obedience from different groups whilst at the same time making the most of stirring up rivalry between them. The result is that almost everyone ends up needing patronage of the Monarch and they reject

any form of dissidence because, in the end, this would lead to isolation and helplessness (Cf. Castien Maestro, 2007b: 93-95; Tozy, 2000). Ideological eclecticism very much encourages this role of mediation and patronage as it limits exclusions and allows the different clientelistic networks to grow and form connections between themselves. The different social sectors rarely share sufficient ideological elements to act in a unified way. Each of these sectors relate only to a portion of society's ideological range. The ruling team, on the other hand, relates to the whole range of ideologies, although very loosely. Therefore, the ruling power can be both modernist and traditionalist, a Defender of the Islamic State and approve the necessity of certain reforms. It is the Guardian of the established order but also the Champion of better social justice; the Promoter of Arabic culture within the country whilst becoming increasingly sensitive towards the Amazigh contingent. More specifically, the King himself can be the Emir of the Faithful for those who want to guard against separation from the divine commandments (Hammoudi, 2001; Martín Muñoz, 2004: 243-248; Tozy, 2000). As the *sherif* he is a descendent of the Prophet and the *baraka* of the constitutional Monarchy. He is the saviour of a nation under construction, an honourable follower of his grandfather's fight for Independence and the technocratic leader and champion of the most humble classes of society. With all of this behind him he can claim different political legitimacies and use whichever role benefits him most in each situation. This is something no other social or political player can do. The ambiguity of the official cultural and ideological synthesis allows him to do all of this without incurring great opposition. In summary, the existence of a significant ideological pluralism benefits an authoritarian power, but the more fractioned and heterogeneous the society is, the more need it has for a mediator like the Monarchy. The Monarchy uses this plurality to its advantage but it is a very particular form of plurality, more of a fragmented plurality.

The Monarchy bases one of its sources of legitimacy on the work of uniting a fragmented society. We could call this a pragmatic legitimacy that is based on the fear that the eventual disappearance of a Monarchy would throw the country into chaos. This kind of fear makes us afraid, to a degree, of internal dissension, the *fitna* that is so entrenched in Muslim thinking. The tragedy seen in Algeria made many more cautious when asking for change. The King is a kind of homeostatic agent and, at the moment, viewed by many as vital for Morocco. His permanent clientelistic patronage can be added to this existing pragmatic legitimacy. He is the great provider of rewards and the man capable of resolving the day to day problems of his people. The media meticulously cultivate this image. The Monarch tours the country, visiting all kinds of places, talking directly to the people, listening to their problems and commanding his aides to resolve them. This establishes a direct link between the King and his subjects, between the patron and his clients, so that the involvement of any other organisations is eclipsed. This populist strategy strengthens his image as a hardworking, dynamic, modern person. He seeks to right the wrongs caused by the politicians and the civil servants and the people go along with his favouritism and corrupt methods, that is, his authentic clientelistic behaviour. The responsibility for the wrongs of clientelism falls on the King's shoulders whilst, at the same time, as often the case, the King reaps great benefits from the good side of clientelism. This peculiar separation of the pleasant and unpleasant

sides to the system is supported by the way the work is split between the King and the elected politicians. The existence of semi-democratic organisations means that the Sovereign does not appear to have absolute power. He governs, but not alone. In this way, the King is safe because any blame can be placed on the politicians. A little democracy helps to strengthen authoritarianism. Something similar occurs with the relative freedom of the press that the country enjoys. Thanks to this freedom a cluster of scandals came to light that delegitimised many public figures. This leads many to think that the Monarchy is necessary to place a certain veneer of respectability over such excess. These media reports add to the everyday experiences of the ordinary people and this contributes to the spreading the idea of the existence of generalised corruption. When clientelism is so widespread, it is easy to view it as something which is the responsibility of society as a whole. The root of the problem lies with the people themselves. It is not something that can be solved just by a change of regime. There is no doubt that recognising the complexity of the problem, rather than giving in to the temptation to place all the blame on the heads of state, is a positive move in that it avoids an overly simplistic and selfish view of the matter. However, that also implies exonerating the head of the system from blame and incurring an excess of collective self-blame.

As a result, building a democracy in Morocco is a long-term task. It cannot be limited to mere institutional reforms, nor will a constitutional limit to the powers of the Monarch suffice, even though both of these may be necessary. The problem is not limited to the kind of government, but affects the whole of society. The latter needs to attain a higher level of internal cohesion which would allow society to rise above the authoritarian tutelage exerted over it today. The success of this strategic objective requires a successful battle against clientelistic relationships. Restricting the current influence of clientelistic networks would mean other, more modern and organised social relationships would develop. A more integrating cultural and identity synthesis is also required. This would help the country to overcome its current fragmented state which is what has allowed it to be so easily manipulated through the power of ideological eclecticism. Creating such a synthesis would mean bridging the current gap between official and popular culture. This would, without doubt, require that the Amazigh cultural contingent be reevaluated. The relatively high level of secularity that is inherent in all modern society would need to be reconciled with certain elements from cultural traditions founded on centuries of Muslim religion (Cf. Castien Maestro, 2009: 97-98). Even if equivalent, fully democratic organisations are established, without these profound changes, rampant clientelism will make a mockery of it all. Much can be learnt from the experience of Latin-America which has had a similar situation for many decades.

## VI. Bibliography

- (1996) AYUBI, Nazih N., *Política y sociedad en Oriente Próximo. La hipertrofia del Estado árabe*, Ediciones Bellaterra, Barcelona.
- (1982) BLAU, Peter, *Intercambio y poder en la vida social*, Editorial Hora, Barcelona.
- (1991) BONTE, Pierre y CONTE, Édouard, "La tribu arabe. Approches anthropologiques et orientalistes". En BONTE, Pierre, CONTE, Édouard, HAMÉS, Constant y OULD CHEIKH, Abdel Wedoud, *Al-Ansâb. La quête des origines. Anthropologie historique de la société tribale arabe*, Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de L'Homme, París, pp. 13-48.
- (1991) BOURDIEU, Pierre, *El sentido práctico*, Taurus, Madrid.
- (2003) CASTIEN MAESTRO, Juan Ignacio, *Las astucias del pensamiento. Creatividad ideológica y adaptación social entre los inmigrantes marroquíes en la Comunidad de Madrid*, Consejo Económico y Social de la Comunidad de Madrid.
- (2007a) CASTIEN MAESTRO, Juan Ignacio, "El Marruecos contemporáneo. El peso de la herencia colonial y precolonial". En ABDEL-KARIM, Gamal y CASTIEN MAESTRO, Juan Ignacio (coords), *Sociedad y política en el mundo mediterráneo actual*, Publicaciones del Instituto Egipcio de Estudios Islámicos en Madrid, pp. 43-104.
- (2007b) CASTIEN MAESTRO, Juan Ignacio, "Wahabismo y modernización. Las ambivalencias de una relación", *Hesperia. Culturas del Mediterráneo*, Año III, Volumen III, ISSN: 1698-8795, Madrid, pp. 71-90.
- (2009) CASTIEN MAESTRO, Juan Ignacio, "Problemas de la modernización en el mundo árabe contemporáneo", *Boletín de Información del CESEDEN*, N° 311, ISSN: 0213-6864, Madrid, pp. 81-99.
- (2010) CASTIEN MAESTRO, Juan Ignacio, "El rompecabezas de la identidad argelina", *Boletín de Información del CESEDEN*, N° 317, ISSN: 0213-6864, Madrid, pp. 77-97.
- (1990) ELIAS, Norbert, *La sociedad de los individuos*, Península, Barcelona.
- (1970) GOFFMAN, Erving, *Internados. Ensayos sobre las instituciones totales*, Amorrortu Editores, Buenos Aires.
- (2001) HAMMOUDI, Abdellah, *Maîtres et disciples. Gèneses et fondements des pouvoirs autoritaires dans les sociétés arabes. Essai d'anthropologie politique*, Maison-Neuve Larose et Les Editions Toubkal, Casablanca.
- (2004) MARTÍN MUÑOZ, Gema, *El Estado árabe. Crisis de legitimidad y contestación islamista*, Ediciones Bellaterra, Casablanca.
- (1984) TAJFEL, Henri, *Grupos humanos y categorías sociales*, Herder, Barcelona.
- (2001) TIBI, Bassam, *La conspiración. El trauma de la política árabe*, Herder, Barcelona.
- (2000) TOZY, Mohamed, *Monarquía e Islam político en Marruecos*, Ediciones Bellaterra, Barcelona.
- (1971) TROTSKY, León, *Historia de la revolución rusa*, Ruedo Ibérico, Francia.